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CONGLOMERATES AND TAKE-OVERS
RICHARD B. SMITH*
To date our securities markets have functioned well enough to win the
admiration of the western world and to become vitally important to our
nation. Any adjustments in their operations must therefore be carefully ad-
ministered, both by the financial community for their entrepreneurial objec-
tives and by the Government for its regulatory responsibilities. Yet none can
deny that the enormous changes occurring in the financial world must result
in adjustments. The Government's response to the emergence of new business
institutions and techniques must be both informed and measured; at the
same time the welfare of public investors and the national interest must re-
main paramount for both the financial community and the Government.
The creation of conglomerates and the acquisition techniques associ-
ated with them are among the most visible of the changes. While a number
of policy issues in the area of conglomerates and takeovers are outside the
scope of the Securities and Exchange Commission, it is a subject of con-
tinual exposure, and one in which the financial community has a vital
interest.
It is not difficult to establish the subject as being current. There has
hardly been a recent edition of a newspaper or magazine in which some
member of the financial press has not only reported, but also extensively
commented on, conglomerates or corporate takeovers, or, more often than
not, both. Most of the alphabet agencies of the Government have recently
been faced with this phenomenon: not only the FTC and the SEC, but as
conglomeration has reached into the regulated industries, the FCC, CAB
and ICC. The Federal Reserve Board, Treasury and the Comptroller are
concerning themselves with bank-involved conglomeration, the one-bank
holding company,' while the Justice Department has taken a renewed look
at the development of this merger hyperactivity. 2 Both houses of Con-
* Commissioner, United States Securities and Exchange Commission. The Securities
and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any private
publication by any of its members. The views expressed herein are those of the author
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission. This article was adapted from
a speech given before the Central States Group of the Investment Bankers Association of
America, Chicago, Illinois, March 19, 1969.
1 On Nov. 5, 1969, the House of Representatives, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., passed H.R. 6778,
amending the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. The bill is now under consideration
by the Senate Banking and Currency Committee. See H.R. REP. No. 387, 91st Cong., Ist
Sess. (1969); 115 CONG. REC. 10,545-75 (daily ed. April 6, 1969).
2 The Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice has brought five
suits seeking to prevent proposed acquisitions by conglomerate corporations: United
States v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., Civil No. 69-438 (W.D. Pa., filed April 16, 1969);
United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., Civil No. 69-6924 (N.D. Ill., filed April 28,
1969); United States v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. Ill., 1969); United
States v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., Civil No. 13319 (D. Conn., filed Aug. 1, 1969),
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gress have called hearings on various aspects of the conglomerate merger
trend.3
Nor is it difficult to see why so much attention has been generated by
this topic. Since the end of World War II, particularly since the early
1950's, there has been an almost uninterrupted merger movement in our
economy - the longest sustained period of economic consolidation in our
history. Rather than subsiding, the movement has continued, with 1967
exceeding even 1899 and 1928 for the largest number of recorded mergers
in the manufacturing sector.4 And 1968 saw 68 percent more mergers than
in 1967. 5 Although the significance and meaning of the statistics have been
questioned, the FTC has stated that in 1968, 90 percent of the assets acquired
in all acquisitions of companies with assets of $10 million or more were
conglomerate in form.6
There is, I believe, a second factor in the arousing of attention to the
conglomerate merger-the combined facts that an increasing number of
these acquisitions have not been particularly friendly, and that the size of
the target companies has become progressively larger. It is unrealistic to
think that the management of large target, or potential target, companies
who want to resist take-over attempts would fail to point out to all branches
and agencies of government the policy issues they see involved in such ac-
tivity. And in the background, or maybe not in the background, is the fear -
some call it real, others call it unreasoning, and yet others say it is inevitable
- that the resulting economic concentration will lead to an economy in
which this country's productive machinery would be controlled by an elite
of super-corporations resembling the Japanese zaibatsus. Clearly the subject
is alive and questions are being asked about this intensified conglomeration
phenomenon - the popular practice of combining diverse, if not divergent,
enterprises into a hopefully viable economic organization.
One might think that by this time everyone would know what a "con-
prelim. inj. denied (Oct. 21, 1969); United States v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., Civil No. 15320
(D. Conn., filed Aug. 1, 1969), prelim. inj. denied (Oct. 21, 1969).
3 Hearings on the subject of economic concentration were commenced by the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, during the 88th
Cong., 2d Sess., July 1, 1964. Additional hearings are planned during the 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. See Hearings on Economic Concentration before the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the
Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pts. 1-8A (1964).
The House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly,
commenced hearings on July 30, 1969. Hearings were held July 30-31, Aug. 6-8 and Nov.
20, 1969. Additional hearings are planned during the 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
The House Committee on Ways and Means heard testimony March 12, 1969 on
conglomerates during its hearings on tax reform. See Hearings on the Subject of Tax
Reform before the House Ways and Means Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 7 (1969).
4 Address by Harrison F. Houghton, Seminar on New Development in Mergers and
Acquisitions, Advanced Management Research, Inc., New York City, Sept. 19, 1968, at 6
(mimeo).
5 BUREAU oF ECONOMIcs, FTC, STAT. REP. No. 3, CURRENT TRENDS IN MERGER ACTIVITY,
1968, at 1 (1969).
6 Id. at 3.
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glomerate" is. Yet, there are hotly contested arguments about that, in no
small part because the term has become too pejorative for those who defend
the trend or too imprecise for those who seek to be as objective as possible
in their analysis of it. This latter motivation led Professor Mautz, in his
comprehensive study of financial reporting published in late 1968 by the
Financial Executives Institute, to use the term "diversified companies."
For purposes of financial reporting, Professor Mautz treated as a "diversi-
fied company" one that either is so managerially decentralized, so lacks
operational integration, or has such diversified markets that it may ex-
perience rates of profitability, degrees of risk, and opportunities for growth
which vary within the company to such an extent that an investor requires
information about these variations in order to make informed decisions.
With some variation that is essentially the definition the SEC proceeded
on in proposing its new rules for disclosure by companies which, in the
Commission's words, "are engaged in more than one line of business." s The
Commission stated that in grouping products or services as lines of business,
appropriate consideration should be given to all relevant factors, including
rates of profitability of operations, degrees of risk, and opportunity for
growth. I shall come back to our requirements later, but one should note that
these definitions for purposes of financial reporting do not relate to how the
conglomeration or diversification occurred, whether by internal growth or
external acquisition.
The FTC, on the other hand, has made use of the word "conglomerate"
in defining the type of acquisition or merger that is neither horizontal
(between competitors) nor vertical (between supplier and manufacturer or
manufacturer and distributor).9 These two types of mergers, horizontal and
vertical, dominated the previous periods of major economic consolidation
in American industrial history - the first of which peaked around the
turn of the century and the latter in the late 1920's. As the former Acting
Director of the FTC Bureau of Economics pointed out, there were some
"conglomerate" mergers in the 1920's, but these were of either the product
extension or market extension type, unlike the "free form" type that pre-
dominates today. Mr. Houghton, who has defined a conglomerate as "a
firm which is engaged in a number of industrial activities serving more or
less distinct markets,"'10 has stated:
It's a question of degree. It could be said that the less a firm is dependent
Y R. MAUTZ, FINANCIAL REPORTING BY DIVERSIFE CoMPANIrs (1968). The term "diver-
sified companies" was also preferred by the Accounting Principles Board of the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants in its release on disclosure of supplemental
financial information. AICPA, Disclosure of Supplemental Financial Information by Diver-
sified Companies, APB STAT. No. 2 (1967).
s See SEC Releases, note 25, infra.
9 Hearings Before the House Ways and Means Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 2410 (1969)
(remarks of Dr. Willard Mueller).
10 Houghton, supra note 4, at 8.
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on any one or a few lines of activity for its economic welfare and the
longer and wider the number of its products or its geographic markets, the
more conglomerated it is. 1
Thus, for the FTC's purposes of maintaining competition, and of engaging
in an in-depth study of the economic efficiency justification for the reduction
in the number of independent business units that conglomeration results in,
there is again a certain vagueness or flexibility in defining the phenome-
non.
12
Conglomerates have been given yet another suggestive description that
bears some pondering. Someone has called them "mutual funds with smoke-
stacks." There is at least an analogy, and perhaps a correlation, between
the institutionalization of investors and the conglomeration of corporations.
There is certainly a time span coincidence between the concentration of
investment decision-making into the hands of managers of larger and larger
capital funds, and the concentration of capital allocation decision-making
into the hands of managers of larger and larger conglomerates. At the same
time that individual investors were purchasing diversification in mutual
funds, they, and the institutional investors, were voting their approval of,
or accepting tender offers for, diversification in conglomerates. As fund
managers are allocators of external equity among a wide range of choices,
so in a primary sense are conglomerate managers allocators of internal
equity among a now wide range of choices. Both movements are big. In the
8 years since 1960 investment company assets grew by $46 billion's while
the assets of conglomerate companies grew by about $30 billion.' 4
The almost side-by-side occurrence of institutionalization in the securi-
ties markets and conglomeration in industry is some indication that there
may be underlying motivations in our society that have produced them
both. For example, both funds and conglomerates rely and promote them-
selves on managerial professionalism and attention to technological innova-
tion. This in turn reflects the unique contribution of this country's business
schools to the industrial, or as some call it, post-industrial, system. In in-
quiring into institutionalization and conglomeration, any thoughtful treat-
ment will have to take account of the immense educational substructure
that is creating the new managerial class, and teaching, in effect, that
principles of management are not limited to a particular business. Account
will also have to be taken of the implications of the computer technology
that significantly expands management's capabilities for both internal and
external investment. While some commentators have focused on the color-
ful individuals in charge of some of the more aggressive conglomerates, I
am suggesting there is more to the phenomenon than personality.
11 d. For a critical view of the Report, see statement by Harold S. Geneen before
the House Antitrust Subcommittee, Nov. 20, 1969, supra note 3.
12 The study has since been published: BUREAU OF ECONOMIcS, FTC, ECONOMIC RE-
PORT ON CORPORATE MERGERS (1969) [hereinafter cited as FTC REPORT].
13 34 SEC ANN. REP. 115 (1968).
14 FTC REPORT at 356.
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Analogy or correlation, such as is suggested here between institution-
alization and conglomeration, is not analysis and can be carried too far-
there are differences. And so only one other possible connection might be
mentioned. The existence of large portfolio positions in some institutional
hands may well have facilitated the ability of conglomerates to acquire
companies held in those portfolios. The current emphasis by many institu-
tions on short term performance probably results in a special receptivity
on the institutions' part to the instant capital appreciation that the public
tender offer techniques produce. Indeed, it can become a cause for concern
to corporate managements when they see substantial institutional stock-
holdings develop in their company - a very different reaction from the
prior, almost universal satisfaction of managements about "strong" institu-
tional interest in their securities.
There is even an interesting definitional question with which the SEC
has been confronted. If a corporation falls within one of the technical defini-
tions of an investment company in the 1940 Act,15 it becomes subject to
all the requirements of that Act, including the rigid and detailed provisions
regulating capital structure. 16 Where any corporation owns or proposes to
acquire "investment securities"17 having a value exceeding 40 percent of
the value of its total assets, it may fall within the definition of an investment
company. The Commission is therefore faced, from time to time, with the
question of whether an aspiring conglomerate has become an investment
company, particularly when a smaller company acquires securities of a
larger company and it is not controlling and directing the affairs of the
target company. The question might be framed as whether the conglomerate
has lost its smokestacks.
The corporate financial landscape does take on a curious aspect when
1554 Stat. 797 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a) (1964). An "investment com-
pany" is defined as any issuer which:
(1) is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage pri-
marily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities;
(2) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of issuing face-amount cer-
tificates of the installment type, or has been engaged in such business and has
any such certificate outstanding; or
(5) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of investing, reinvesting,
owning, holding. or trading in securities, and owns or proposes to acquire
investment securities having a value exceeding 40 per centum the value of such
issuer's total assets (exclusive of government securities and cash items) on an
unconsolidated basis. Id.
For purposes of the Investment Company Act, the term "security" is defined as:
any note, stock, Treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, cer-
tificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-
trust certificate, pre-organization certificate or subscription, transferable share,
investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security,
fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general,
any interest or instrument commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of
interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for,
guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the fore-
going.
54 Stat. 790 (1940), as amended, 15 US.C. § 80a-2(35) (1964).
18 See 54 Stat. 817 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18 (1964).
17 See note 15 supra.
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viewed through its tiers of financial intermediation. It serves to show the
distance we have traveled from the days when the only non-farming invest-
ment opportunity for someone who had saved would either be in his own
business or in another single product-local market enterprise, almost always
owned and operated by someone he knew. Today, a saver might purchase
shares in a mutual fund (or even a financial vehicle that in turn purchases
mutual fund shares). The mutual fund, in its turn, in addition to allocating
its portfolio through a number of industries, invests a significant portion
of its assets in conglomerate companies. They in their turn allocate their
capital through a number of industries. Thus, the distance from saver to
ultimate investment in real assets is lengthened, and the role and com-
plexity of the intervening financial assets are enlarged. Whether that is the
ultimate in economic efficiency or in investment risk aversion I do not know,
but it is a profound fact that underlies today's discussions on conglomera-
tion.
The questions are not simple-nor do they suggest simplistic treat-
ment. At least until all the evidence is in, it would seem premature to lump
all conglomerates together and classify them as harmful. The SEC's concern,
of course, does not reach the broader economic policy questions encom-
passed in the antitrust and tax laws or in the substantive statutes regu-
lating particular industries.18 The securities industry may have its version of
the conglomerate problem bound up in the questions of institutional member-
ship on the exchanges and public ownership of member firms. But those
questions also involve other considerations. In any case, the focus here is
on industrial conglomerates and the manner in which they are being as-
sembled.
The Commission's contact with the current conglomerate phenomenon
occurs at several junctures: I shall refer to just two. The first occurs when
a tender or exchange offer is made. If securities are being offered in ex-
change for those of a target company, the tenderor must file a registration
statement under the Securities Act of 1933,19 which provides information
not only about the tendering company but also the target company. The
offer cannot be made until the registration statement becomes effective.
18 There is another statute administered by the Commission that should be kept in
mind -the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 2393. That statute is
the most drastic financial legislation ever enacted by the Congress. The SEC's administra-
tion of the 1935 Act involved the simplification of the complex, watered and highly
leveraged capital structures of public utility holding companies and integration of the
public utility systems. The integration requirements led to the divestment of both geo-
graphically dispersed utility properties and of non-utility businesses that were not rea-
sonably incidental or economically necessary or appropriate to the operations of the
integrated utility system. While not suggesting that contemporary conglomerates have
brought us to this point, the 1935 Act does remind us that if things go far enough, the
legislative remedy can be severe.
19 48 Stat. 77 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1964). An exchange of shares con-
stitutes a sale for purposes of the 1933 Act. 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b(3) (1964).
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When cash is being offered, the tendering company, upon announcing the
tender offer, must immediately file with the Commission an information
statement under the 1968 take-over legislation.20 Under either procedure the
news of the impending take-over bid is likely to hit stockholders, and in-
vestors generally, with trip-hammer suddenness.
The announcement of a tender offer is generally accompanied by a
dramatic rise in the price of the target company's securities, considerable
market activity by speculators and arbitrageurs, and general confusion on
the part of the target company's stockholders and employees. If one of the
purposes of the securities legislation is to make the investment decision as
rational a one as possible, it is difficult to imagine an atmosphere less con-
ducive to rational thinking than the heat and haste generated by tender
offers. Particularly where complex securities packages are being offered, the
time generally provided for investors to reach a decision hardly seems suffi-
dent. And the pressure on the management of the target company to present
its case in time to offset the impact of surprise is enormous. This hardly
seems conducive to rational investor decision on the merits.
Also, there is general concern over the use being made in takeover bids
of complex securities, or complex packages of securities. A typical exchange
offer might consist of a proposal to issue a package of securities consisting
of:
(1) $45 principal amount of subordinated debentures, often bearing a
curious rate of interest;
(2) 3/5ths of one share of preferred stock, that has no public market;
and
(3) 3/10ths of a five-year warrant to purchase 1 share of common
stock, at a specified price other than current market, all in exchange for
2 shares of common stock of the target company.
Such a package must be a little difficult to evaluatel
The stockholder of a target company may also experience difficulty in
evaluating the relative rights of the securities being offered to him - rela-
tive to those of the other outstanding securities of the acquiring company.
To cite an example of the type of analytical problem confronting stock-
holders, a prospectus filed with the Commission by one conglomerate com-
pany contains a five page capitalization table, including detailed footnotes.
Securities with a conversion feature have been increasingly used in
exchange offers, and such a feature may also prove difficult to evaluate. Of
the $11.2 billion worth of securities registered for the purpose of exchange
offers in 1968, $4.8 billion represented convertible bonds and convertible
preferred stock, compared to $4.6 billion in straight common.21 The trend
20 82 Stat. 454, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(e) (Supp. IV, 1968); 82 Stat. 456, 15 U.S.C. § 78n
(d)(e)(f) (Supp. IV, 1968).
21 Unpublished data obtained from Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of
Policy Research.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
is toward the use of convertible bonds. In the last quarter of 1968, securities
in the amount of $3.2 billion were registered in connection with exchange
offers, of which $1.7 billion, or more than half, represented convertible
bonds.22
The utilization of convertible debt securities may appear to be the
best of all possible worlds, securing for the acquirer the advantages of both
debt and equity. But as SEC Chairman Budge has pointed out, it should not
be forgotten that convertible debt securities may also have some of the dis-
advantages of both. If a conglomerate continued to expand via the debt-
leverage route, it might impose new classes of senior securities ahead of
the current issue and become so heavily leveraged that the security offered
by a debt position becomes illusory. The advantage of the conversion
privilege may also prove illusory, both because inflated expectations for
future growth of the acquiring company may have been created by the
current acquisition techniques, and because the security holder may not
realize the potential dilution if other convertible security holders convert
into shares of the same class.28 Moreover, in some convertible debt issues
it seems impossible that the debt could be paid off as debt.
The increasing use of debt for acquisitions is also true in cash tender
offers. In the 72 cash tender offers filed with the SEC between August 1968
and the end of June 1969, more than $1.6 billion of the total $2 billion
offered was financed by bank loans.2 4
One consequence of the increase in debt financing is that companies
with free liquid assets have become popular as targets for takeover bids.
Upon acquisition the liquid assets can be pledged by the acquiring company
to secure funds for further acquisitions or to partially liquidate loans made
to acquire the target company. While high debt-equity ratios are not
necessarily bad, they are legitimate cause for concern if the reason for
incurring long-term debt risk is to achieve short-term capital appreciation
in a company's stock by structuring a glamorous earnings per share multiple.
This leads to a second point of Commission contact with conglomera-
tion - in the resulting financial statements of the conglomerate company.
This concern about the conglomerate's financial statements encompasses
both the accounting treatment given to the acquisition or merger, and the
disclosure of income information, with respect to the acquired business
after the acquisition is consummated.
22 Id.
23 Another practice which has been used to create the illusion of an increase in
earnings per share is the failure of some companies to include convertible securities and
the other so-called "common stock equivalents" in the computation of earnings per share.
The APB has stated that all securities including warrants and options that are substan-
tially equivalent to common stock should be included in a primary earnings per share
figure, and a supplemental fully diluted earnings per share figure to show the maximum
potential dilution of current earnings by any other securities on a prospective basis must
be given. AICPA, Earnings Per Share, APB Op. No. 15 (1969).
24 See note 21 supra.
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The accounting treatment problem relates to whether the merged
companies are combined for accounting purposes through the "pooling-of-
interests" method or the "purchase" method. If the former method is
utilized, the accounts of the two companies are, in substance, added to-
gether with no reflection of the current fair value of the assets acquired or
the full cost of acquisition, even where one of the pooled corporations
is 9 or 10 times the size of the other. If the acquiring company has a
higher price earnings multiple than the acquired company and the ex-
change is negotiated on that basis, the mathematical result is that the
combined enterprise will show an increase in earnings per share, even
though there has been no improvement in real earnings. The Commission
and the accounting profession have dealt with this mathematical result of
pooling on computation of earnings per share by requiring a restatement
of the prior year's per share earnings on the same basis as the present
year's, having the mathematical effect of increasing the prior year's also,
and thereby flattening out what would otherwise be a sharp upward trend
in earnings per share.
Unfortunately, the purchase method is not without its problems either.
The amount paid for the target company is nearly always greater than the
current fair value of its assets. The excess is treated in the accounts of the
acquiring company as goodwill, and the problem becomes what to do with
this large intangible item. Accountants argue over whether such goodwill
can be left on the books forever, must be written off immediately against
surplus, or must be amortized against income over some period of time.
The pooling-purchase accounting problem is currently being worked on
intensively by the APB and the Commission has a deep interest in a proper
result there.
The problem with regard to future disclosure of information about the
acquired business was the subject of the Commission's amendments to
Forms S-1, S-7 and 10, proposed in September 1968, revised in February
1969 and adopted in July 1969.25 The revised forms provide investors with
financial information about the important components of a conglomerate
enterprise. Briefly stated, the amended forms require diversified companies
with total revenues over $50 million to disclose for each of a maximum of
5 fiscal years beginning with 1967 the approximate amount or percentage,
attributable to each line of business meeting certain size standards, of (i)
total sales and operating revenues and (ii) contribution to income before
income taxes and extraordinary items. The lines of business that must be
so reported are those that contributed, during either of the last two fiscal
years, 10 percent or more to (i) total sales and operating revenues or (ii)
25 The original proposals were contained in SEC Securities Act Release No. 4922
(Sept. 4, 1968), and the revised proposals in SEC Securities Act Release No. 4949 (Feb. 18,
1969). The proposed amendments were adopted by the Commission in SEC Securities Act
Release No. 4988 (July 14, 1969).
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income before income taxes and extraordinary items. Similar disclosure
is also required with respect to any line of business which resulted in a loss
of 10 percent or more of such income before deduction of losses. Where the
number of lines of business exceeds 10, the disclosure may be limited to the
10 most important lines.
The new forms, which constitute an important advance in corporate
disclosure, should help to provide investors with information about con-
glomerates that is needed to test in part the validity of an often cited rea-
son for their creation, the theory of synergism. In its corporate context this
theory implies that the total capabilities of a conglomerate exceed those of
the sum of its constituent parts. That sounds impressive, a little mysterious
perhaps. The new forms are a step in the direction of removing some of
the mystery by providing information about the parts.
